NATO is developing a defence strategy that would include strikes against military bases, supply depots, industrial facilities and other targets deep inside Russia if Moscow attacked the Alliance, according to The Wall Street Journal.
The approach marks a significant shift from decades of thinking that focused primarily on stopping Soviet or Russian forces at NATO’s borders.
Under plans developed under Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO forces would not only repel the initial assault. They would then seek to dismantle the wider system supporting the attack.
That could mean striking logistics hubs, command structures, military bases, industrial sites and critical infrastructure far behind the front line.
The concept draws heavily on lessons from Ukraine, where the ability to hit ammunition depots, air bases, factories and supply routes deep behind Russian lines has become an increasingly important part of the war.
NATO would target the system behind an attack
Grynkewich has described the approach as a “theory of victory”.
The first task would be to stop the initial wave of an invasion. NATO would then attack the forces and infrastructure that allow the enemy to sustain its offensive.
“We will break the warfighting system engaged against us by hitting both advancing forces and anything and everything that supports, sustains or controls that force,” Grynkewich said.
The strategy does not envisage escalation to nuclear weapons.
Instead, NATO is focusing on conventional precision weapons capable of reaching targets from roughly 150 kilometres to several thousand kilometres behind the front.
These would include high-end cruise and ballistic missiles as well as cheaper weapons such as long-range drones.
The potential target set would extend beyond traditional military installations. Defence factories, infrastructure and resources supporting Russia’s war effort could also be targeted.
Polish Air Force Inspector Major General Ireneusz Nowak said the war in Ukraine had demonstrated a fundamental lesson.
“Defence also means striking back,” he said.
Nowak argued that if Ukraine had possessed sufficient deep-strike capabilities at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the war might not have developed into the kind of grinding positional conflict associated with the First World War.
The message to Moscow, he said, should be that an attack would carry consequences far beyond the battlefield.
But deterrence only works if NATO actually possesses the weapons needed to make that threat credible.
Europe is racing to build long-range weapons
European countries are consequently trying to expand their stocks of long-range missiles while developing cheaper weapons that can be produced in much larger numbers.
Fabian Hoffmann, a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, told the Wall Street Journal that European manufacturers are pursuing dozens of projects aimed at developing lower-cost cruise missiles.
The reason is partly economic.
Highly sophisticated missiles can cost millions of euros each and are difficult to manufacture quickly enough for a prolonged high-intensity war. Ukraine has demonstrated the value of combining these weapons with cheaper drones and missiles that can be produced and launched in far greater numbers.
Ukraine itself has already adopted a similar approach, using domestically produced long-range weapons, including Flamingo cruise missiles and strike drones, against Russian military and economic targets far behind the front.
The broader objective is sometimes described as attacking the archer rather than continually trying to shoot down the arrows: destroying the bases, factories, depots and logistics networks that make repeated attacks possible.
Whether Europe’s political leaders would be prepared to authorise extensive strikes deep inside Russia during an actual war remains an open question.
But NATO’s military planning increasingly reflects the conclusion drawn from Ukraine: stopping an invasion at the border may not be enough. An attacker must also be denied the ability to continue the war.