NATO’s newly unveiled “Theory of Victory” is above all an exercise in strategic signalling, says retired Colonel Petteri Kajanmaa, a researcher at the NATO Defense College.
Military leaders and security experts have long warned that Russia could attempt a limited territorial incursion in order to test NATO’s political willingness to respond.
General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, outlined the concept at a security forum in Poland on Monday. The vision combines precision weapons with large numbers of cheaper unmanned systems, drones and electronic warfare capabilities.
“This was strategic communication,” Kajanmaa tells Verkkouutiset. “At a time when citizens in allied countries are concerned about the unstable security environment, the message is that NATO has the situation under control.”
“At the same time, it sends a message to potential adversaries — meaning Russia — that NATO is capable and has all the necessary means, but that the alliance is not the party seeking to escalate any military crisis.”
The concept is intended to counter a possible limited Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank. Grynkewich has said such an attack remains unlikely at present.
“Block, blunt and break”
The approach is built around what Grynkewich described as a “block, blunt, break” strategy.
The first task would be to halt an enemy advance at the border. NATO’s forward-deployed ground forces would seek to stop the incursion while high-technology systems were used to disrupt and destroy the adversary’s ability to command its forces.
These capabilities are being developed as part of NATO’s Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative, combining drones, AI-assisted targeting, integrated data networks and layered defences designed to stop or weaken an attack in its opening stages.
The systems would allow allies to target enemy command, communications and targeting networks through a combination of kinetic strikes and cyber or electronic attacks.
If necessary, NATO could then employ more traditional heavy firepower, including aircraft and missiles, to break the adversary’s broader combat system.
Kajanmaa says the underlying idea is not new.
“What is new is that it has now been made public,” he says. “The idea behind the Theory of Victory is to create a situation already in peacetime where war does not happen. And if war does begin, it becomes as costly as possible for the adversary.”
“The aim is to prevent escalation by demonstrating deterrence strongly enough. That is the path to victory. On the one hand, you are telling the other side that it is not worth trying. On the other, you are creating the capabilities to ensure that if confrontation comes, you will have the advantage.”
Deterrence is not weakness
Kajanmaa points to Grynkewich’s choice of words — “block, blunt and break” — as part of the wider message.
“Of those three words, only ‘block’ is a military task in NATO terminology,” he says. “Stopping the adversary from getting through is the least escalatory stage.”
“‘Blunt’ and ‘break’ have clearly been chosen as tools of strategic communication. They are deliberately broad terms.”
In Kajanmaa’s view, Grynkewich also underlined an important point about NATO’s defensive posture.
“Although NATO is a defensive organisation, that does not mean weakness or a lack of capabilities. It is a choice.”
He also agrees with Grynkewich that the most important foundation of NATO deterrence is unity.
“Without a united NATO, the alliance has very little,” Kajanmaa says. “If someone starts breaking ranks, the entire structure is put at risk — and that is exactly what Russia seeks to achieve by intimidating individual member states.”